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The master thesis is divided into three major parts. The first part elaborates on the roots, the nature and the specific pattern of the financial crisis in the United States and Europe, compares them and then describes the development respectively the different phases of the crisis in more detail. The second part compares the central banking systems in the U. S. and in Europe. The two parts (financial crisis comparison and institutional comparison) lay the foundation for a better understanding of the third part (policy comparison), which compares the monetary policy response of US Federal Reserve System and the Eurosystem during the financial crisis.
The master thesis comes to the conclusion that since the 1980s a number of changes in the regulatory incentive system on both sides of the Atlantic led to a partially dysfunctional banking and financial system. The dysfunction of the financial system materialized itself (resulted) in a first phase (1998-2007/08) in an enormous misallocation of capital in the financial as well as in the real economy along with a massive (over) expansion of debt in the private sector. When the enormous asset overvaluation in the bank balance sheets became apparent, in a second phase (2007/08-2013) a massive and long asset depreciation process as well as bank runs of the institutional investors on the short-term liabilities set in and as a result of the huge slump in the econonomy as well as bank bailouts and fiscal stimulus programs debt in the public sector increased heavily as well. Although the nature of the crisis in the U. S. and in Europe was similar, there were major differences in the specific patterns in the buildup as well as the unfolding of and the dealing with the crises.
In contrast to the time after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, central banks on both sides of the Atlantic reacted – from a purely monetary policy standpoint - appropriately in the 2007/08 crisis, in the sense that they acted from the very beginning as lender of the last resort for financial institutes in order to support credit markets and restore their functioning. A first major difference in the monetary policy response between the FED and the ECB during the crisis was that the FED exercised its role as lender of the last resort for a shorter time period (2007-2008) than the ECB (entire assessment period 2007-2013) and that from 2009 on the FED decreased in addition to short-term interest rates also long-term interest rates via several large asset purchase programs (LSAPs/QEs). These differences in monetary policy between the FED and the ECB during the crisis have their roots among other things in the different mandates of both central banks as well as the incomplete monetary union and the related severity of the crisis in the Eurozone. A second major difference in monetary policy during the financial crisis was the appearance of the FED as international lender of the last resort. Thereby the FED exercised in contrast to the period after the crash in 1929 its unique role as central bank of the most important reserve and trade currency in order to provide sufficient US-Dollar liquidity to other central banks to reduce the international US-Dollar liquidity shortage. In contrast to the fiscal, regulatory and (European) integration policy side, both the FED as well as the ECB – from a purely monetary policy standpoint – so far has done its part to overcome the current financial and economic crisis.
Язык: Английский
Знание языков: Носитель языка, В совершенстве
The master thesis comes to the conclusion that since the 1980s a number of changes in the regulatory incentive system on both sides of the Atlantic led to a partially dysfunctional banking and financial system. The dysfunction of the financial system materialized itself (resulted) in a first phase (1998-2007/08) in an enormous misallocation of capital in the financial as well as in the real economy along with a massive (over) expansion of debt in the private sector. When the enormous asset overvaluation in the bank balance sheets became apparent, in a second phase (2007/08-2013) a massive and long asset depreciation process as well as bank runs of the institutional investors on the short-term liabilities set in and as a result of the huge slump in the econonomy as well as bank bailouts and fiscal stimulus programs debt in the public sector increased heavily as well. Although the nature of the crisis in the U. S. and in Europe was similar, there were major differences in the specific patterns in the buildup as well as the unfolding of and the dealing with the crises.
In contrast to the time after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, central banks on both sides of the Atlantic reacted – from a purely monetary policy standpoint - appropriately in the 2007/08 crisis, in the sense that they acted from the very beginning as lender of the last resort for financial institutes in order to support credit markets and restore their functioning. A first major difference in the monetary policy response between the FED and the ECB during the crisis was that the FED exercised its role as lender of the last resort for a shorter time period (2007-2008) than the ECB (entire assessment period 2007-2013) and that from 2009 on the FED decreased in addition to short-term interest rates also long-term interest rates via several large asset purchase programs (LSAPs/QEs). These differences in monetary policy between the FED and the ECB during the crisis have their roots among other things in the different mandates of both central banks as well as the incomplete monetary union and the related severity of the crisis in the Eurozone. A second major difference in monetary policy during the financial crisis was the appearance of the FED as international lender of the last resort. Thereby the FED exercised in contrast to the period after the crash in 1929 its unique role as central bank of the most important reserve and trade currency in order to provide sufficient US-Dollar liquidity to other central banks to reduce the international US-Dollar liquidity shortage. In contrast to the fiscal, regulatory and (European) integration policy side, both the FED as well as the ECB – from a purely monetary policy standpoint – so far has done its part to overcome the current financial and economic crisis.
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